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ABSTRACT 
Integrating security testing into the workflow of software 
developers not only can save resources for separate security 
testing but also reduce the cost of fixing security vulnerabilities by 
detecting them early in the development cycle. We present an 
automatic testing approach to detect a common type of Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS) vulnerability caused by improper encoding of 
untrusted data. We automatically extract encoding functions used 
in a web application to sanitize untrusted inputs and then evaluate 
their effectiveness by automatically generating XSS attack strings. 
Our evaluations show that this technique can detect 0-day XSS 
vulnerabilities that cannot be found by static analysis tools. We 
will also show that our approach can efficiently cover a common 
type of XSS vulnerability. This approach can be generalized to 
test for input validation against other types injections such as 
command line injection. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.5 [Software Engineering]: Testing and debugging – Code 
inspections and walk-throughs. D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: 
Security and Protection – Verification.  
General Terms 
 Security, Verification. 
Keywords 
Sanitization evaluation; Unit testing; Security test harness; cross-
site scripting (XSS); program analysis; Attack generation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In web applications data from untrusted sources, such as user 
provided profile and comments, are often displayed on web pages. 
An attacker can exploit such applications by providing 
information containing malicious JavaScript programs that can be 
executed to cause harm, such as stealing innocent user’s login 
credentials. To prevent such Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks, 
one of the most common security attacks today, web applications 
should sanitize untrusted data using output encoding functions 
before displaying them on web pages. Static analysis 
techniques[14] are widely used to check whether a web 
application uses encoding functions to sanitize untrusted data. 
However, static analysis cannot verify whether the encoding 
functions are used correctly. Testing must be performed to ensure 
that the encoding function is used effectively to prevent XSS 
attacks. In this paper we consider web applications written in Java 
and JSP. Our approach can be extended to web applications 
written in other languages as well. 
To successfully prevent XSS attacks, encoding must match the 
context in which untrusted data appears. The following contexts 
have been identified for a typical web application: HTML body, 
HTML attribute, CSS, URL, and JavaScript[15]. Well-tested 
encoders have been written for each of these contexts.  A common 
programming error is that one chooses a wrong encoder for a 
given application context. Consider the fragment of JSP program 
in Figure 1. Native Java code is enclosed in <%  %>.  
1) <% String pid = (String)request.getParameter("pid");  %> 
2) <% String x = (String) request.getParameter(“addr”);%> 
3) <a href="javascript:void(0)" 
onclick="action(<%=escapeHtml( pid ) %>');" >  mylink 
</a> 
4) <p> <%=escapeHtml(x) %>  
Figure 1. Motivation Example 
This example has two user provided input: pid and x. Variable pid 
is used as part of rendering an HTML anchor element on line 3, 
and x is displayed in the HTML body on line 4. A maliciously 
supplied input for x might be <script> attack(); </script>.  If the 
encoding function, escapeHtml(), were not applied, this would 
cause the execution of the JavaScript function attack(). Encoding 
function escapeHtml() would replace < and > characters with &lt; 
and &gt; respectively and transform the malicious input into 
&lt;script&gt; attack(); &lt;/script&gt; thus preventing attack(); 
from being interpreted as a JavaScript program by the browser.  
However, the same encoding function does not work for the case 
on line 3. A malicious input for pid might be ‘a’); attack(); // and 
it will pass escapeHtml() unchanged. The rendered anchor 
element would be <a href= “javascript:void(0)” 
onclick=”action(‘a’);attack();//”> mylink </a> invoking 
JavaScript function attack() when the link is clicked. The reason 
for this vulnerability is that the wrong encoder function is used for 
this context. The correct encoder, a JavaScript encoder, would 
replace the single quote character with \’ thus preventing this 
attack. One Google sponsored study showed that 30% of encoding 
function usage is incorrect [11]  leading to serious vulnerabilities 
for web applications. There are also cases where more than one 
encoding function must be used (an untrusted input occurs in two 
contexts simultaneously, e.g. JavaScript context and URL 
context). The order of applying encoders is sometimes important.  
To address this problem, a best practice-programming guide has 
been published by the OWASP foundation [9] to inform 
developers to match encoders to web contexts. However, there is 
no systematic way to test whether encoder functions are used 
correctly. Penetration testing, which often happens late in the 
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software development cycle, is relied upon to test for XSS 
vulnerabilities. 
Other efforts have looked at using type inference to detect the 
context of an untrusted variable so the correct encoding function 
can be and automatically applied [11]. To aid type inference, such 
efforts all work with template languages[11], such as Closure 
Templates or HandleBars, that have stronger type systems than 
W3C languages. There are at least three limitations of this 
approach. First, a template language covers a subset of available 
web technologies. Second, there are many web applications that 
do not use template languages at all. Third, type inference is not 
fully successful. For example a research team from Yahoo! [7] 
found that they could identify the correct context in about 90.9% 
of applications written in HandleBars. A Google sponsored 
research[11] also showed that type inference is not possible for 
some cases for applications written in Closure Templates, which 
they proposed a runtime auto-sanitization mechanism that may 
incur significant (9%) run time performance penalty.  Other 
researchers [2,3,12] used similar combinatorial pattern-based 
attack generation mechanisms to test XSS vulnerabilities. By 
focusing on unit testing of encoding functions, our approach can 
not only discover vulnerabilities much earlier in the development 
cycle but also provide precise feedback to developers to fix the 
vulnerability. We have a clearly defined vulnerability model 
which provides a basis for more formal analysis of test coverage. 
Related works relied on analysis of test output to evaluate tests, 
our test evaluation is based on execution behavior which can 
discover subtle vulnerabilities originated from internal browsers 
decoding function mentioned in [8,15]. Our approach works with 
all existing web languages. Integrating security testing into the 
workflow of software developers not only can save efforts on 
separate security testing but also reduces the cost of fixing 
security vulnerabilities by detecting them early in the 
development cycle. 
2. APPROACH 
This section provides a detailed description of our approach. We 
first more precisely define the type of vulnerability we are aiming 
to detect via automatic testing. We then describe three key steps 
of our approach: extracting unit tests from application source, 
evaluating unit tests, and generation of attack strings. 
2.1 Vulnerability Model 
We assume the web application follows best secure programming 
practice[9] by using correctly implemented encoding functions. 
An encoder function is designed for a given web context, such as 
HTML body and replaces characters that are unsafe in that 
context. An unsafe character is a special character that may be 
interpreted by the browser as a part of the markup language. For 
example character < is unsafe in an HTML body context because 
it can start a new HTML element.  Character < is replaced by &lt; 
in an HTML body by HTML encoder. Character single quote is 
considered safe in HTML body context and thus not changed. 
However, single quote is unsafe for the JavaScript context 
because it can be used to launch attacks.   
We define a variable x as tainted, if it is assigned a value from 
untrusted inputs such as request.getParameter(). Common sources 
of untrusted input for web applications are well known to 
commercial static analysis tools. In this paper, we define a 
security sink as a Java statement generating output containing a 
tainted variable in JSP. These Java statements in JSP can be easily 
identified as they are marked by <%= … %> tags.   
Encoder f is safe for context C means for all possible input x such 
that x contains unsafe characters in context C, f(x) doesn’t 
contain unsafe characters in context C (this implies f(x)!=x).The 
type of vulnerability we seek to find using unit tests involves an 
attack string that can successfully pass through an encoder 
unchanged. 
Encoder f is vulnerable for a context C means there is an input x 
such that f(x)=x ( from the browser’s view), and x contains a 
JavaScript program that can be successfully executed in C . 
We put the caveat “from the browser’s view” because browsers 
may treat certain characters as equivalent in specific contexts. For 
example &#39; is equivalent to single quote character in the 
HTML body context. Given this vulnerability model, our goal is 
to develop an attack generator such that if the encoder function is 
vulnerable, a successful attack string can be found. We envision 
this to be implemented as an IDE plug-in to automatically build 
security “unit test cases” based on encoding function usages and 
then evaluate them by applying generated attack strings.  
2.2 Unit Test Extraction 
We extract security unit test cases, or simply referred to as a unit 
tests automatically based on application source code using data 
and control flow analyses. A unit test is centered on the encoding 
of a tainted variable. It should contain sufficient web application 
context so that we can test whether the encoder is vulnerable for 
this context. Therefore, a unit test is a set of statements that starts 
with the introduction of a tainted variable and ends with putting 
the tainted variable in a security sink. Again, we define a sink as 
an output generating Java statement containing f(e) where f is an 
encoding function and e is an expression containing a tainted 
variable. Expression e always evaluates to a string. For this paper, 
we assume each sink contains one tainted variable and one sink in 
a unit test. Our approach, however, can be generalized in the 
future to include multiple variables. 
1. <% String pid = (String)request.getParameter("pid");   
2. if( pid.startswith(‘2015’) ) 
3.     pid  =session.getAttribute("group") + pid; 
4. else 
5.     pid  =session.getAttribute("OU") + pid; %> 
6. <table><tr><td>  
7.  Project ID=  <%=escapeHtml(pid ) %> </p> 
8. <% for ( int c=0; c < Tasks(pid).length(); c++ ) { %> 
9. <a href="javascript:void(0)" onclick="action( c , '    
<%=escapeHtml( pid ) %>');" > Details  </a> 
10. <% } %> </td></tr></table> 
Figure 2. Source Code Under Test 
We illustrate the unit test extraction process through the example 
in Figure 2.  The goal is to build an executable unit that only 
contains application logic surrounding the encoding function. In 
this example there are two security sinks (lines 7 and 9), each 
corresponds to a different unit test. Figure 3 is the unit test based 
on the security sink of line 9 in Figure 2. 
Variable pid is tainted because it is originated from user input 
(request.getParameter). The test case includes the security sink as 
well as any W3C language elements (CSS, HTML, JavaScript 
etc.) necessary to execute the security sink. In Figure 2 these 
language elements include the anchor tag (starting with {<a 
href=…} on line 7), and if statement from line 2 to line 5 of 
Figure 2.  
  
UnitTest1.JSP 
1. <html><body> <script> function Fn(x) {  return; } </script> 
2. <% String pid = “Constant” +  request.getParameter("atk");   
3. if( pid.startswith(‘2015’) ) 
4.      pid  =”” + pid; 
5. else 
6.      pid  =”” + pid;  %>  
7. <a href="javascript:void(0)" onclick="Fn(' <%=escapeHtml( 
pid ) %>');"  id=”tagid”>   </a> 
8. <%   } %> </body></html> 
Figure 3. Extracted Unit Test 
The if statement is included because it is related to variable pid. 
Any variables (e.g. session.getAttribute("group") on lines 3 and 5 
in Figure 2)  are replaced with null string giving the attacker the 
best chance to succeed. 
Special attention is given to cases where the security sink is a 
parameter to a JavaScript function, as is the case on line 9 in 
Figure 2, where an application specific function action(_,_) with 
two parameters is used. It is sufficient to test if a successful attack 
can be found against a generic JavaScript function with only one 
parameter. If such an attack is successful then the wrong encoder 
is being used and an attack for the original function can easily be 
constructed. Therefore, we replace any JavaScript function 
containing the security sink (e.g. function action(_,_) in Figure 2) 
with a predefined function having one parameter returning a null 
string value, as illustrated on line 7 in Figure 3. This predefined 
function Fn() is defined on line 1 of the Figure 3.  
The for-loop on line 8 is not included because it does not impact 
any values in executing the security sink. 
 
2.3 Attack Evaluation  
The goal of attack evaluation is to assess whether the extracted 
unit test is vulnerable to any of the generated attack strings. We 
utilize JWebUnit features to execute the test web page and check 
the result of invoked web page to verify whether each attack 
string generated is successful.  Our attack payload changes the 
title of the web page if it is successfully executed. So if a change 
in title is detected, then the attack string is successful.  
We use JWebUnit because some XSS vulnerabilities are only 
revealed when the attack script is executed in a real browser. Also 
we must simulate user interface behaviors (such as mouse clicks) 
because some attacks are only successful upon user-generated 
events. These testing can also be done using other testing libraries 
such as PhantomJS or CasperJS if they can be fully integrated in a 
testing framework such as JUnit to be used in a IDE like Eclipse.  
A unit test driver is created for each unit case. Figure 4 shows test 
driver for the test code in Figure 3. After initializing an instance 
of WebTester (subclass of JWebUnit) on line 1, line 2 sets the 
base url of the application under test. Each iteration of the loop on 
line 3 takes one generated attackString and invokes the unit test 
page (UnitTest1.jsp). Line 5 is included only when the test code 
includes an event, “onclick” as in this example. The test driver 
needs to simulate the user action of clicking the link to see if any 
attack is triggered by the clicking event. The next line clicks the 
hyperlink in unit test (line 7 in Figure 3). If page’s title equals to 
“ATTACK” then the encoder function is vulnerable for this 
application context. 
Java Code to Invoking UnitTest1.jsp: 
1.   WebTester tester =  new WebTester (); 
2.   tester.setBaseUrl("Address Of Main App");     
3.   for( String attackString: generatedAttackScripts)  {   
4.      tester.beginAt("UnitTest1.JSP?atk="+ attackString);  
5.      tester.clickLink("tagid"); 
6.      // Attack vector changes the page’s title to “ATTACK”. It 
is required to check whether it is changed or not. 
7.      tester.assertTitleNotEquals("ATTACK");   
8. } 
Figure 4. Attack Evaluation 
3. ATTACK GENERATION 
The goal of attack generation is to generate attack strings with 
JavaScript programs as input to the security unit tests. We define 
the attack string as composed of pre-escaping characters, attack 
payload, and post-escaping characters substrings. Figure 5 shows 
an example of this pattern.  
 Pre  Attack Payload  Post  
 ‘); attack();  // 
Original Source:  
<input type='button' onclick="fn(‘<%= escapeHtml(x) %> ’); " /> 
After Attack: 
 <input type='button' onclick=" fn(' '); attack(1); //  ’); " /> 
Figure 5. Basic Attack Vector Pattern 
The attack payload can be any valid JavaScript statement and pre 
and post strings are string literals required to manipulate the 
browser to correctly parse and then execute the attack payload as 
a valid JavaScript statement. Pre and Post escaping strings are 
thus key elements to generating a successful attack string. A web 
page consists of HTML elements, which can be described by 
W3C published XML grammar[13] shown in Figure 6. 
 
element           ::=  STag content ETag 
STag               ::= '<' Name (Attribute)* '>' 
Attribute         ::=  Name Eq AttValue 
AttValue       ::=  '"' ([^<&"] | Ref)* '"'  |  "'" ([^<&'] | Ref)* "'" 
Content       ::=  CharData? ((element | Ref | CDSect | PI | 
Comment) CharData?)* 
ETag       ::=   '</' Name '>' 
Figure 6. XML elements grammar 
An attack string can appear in one of three contexts: as part of 
attValue, part of content, or part of a JavaScript program. 
Attacks cannot be part of the ETag because it does not allow any 
attributes. We refer to these three options as attribute values, tag 
bodies and JavaScript. Attack strings must be generated for all 
three contexts. Our approach to generate attack strings is based on 
a finite state machine. The state machine is constructed based on 
an empirical model for a generic browser developed by[15] as 
well as W3C published language specifications[13]. A browser 
has an interpreter for each of the languages it processes: HTML, 
CSS, JavaScript, etc. Upon reading certain tokens from the input 
stream, a given interpreter may call upon another interpreter, a 
process referred to as context switching. For example an HTML 
interpreter, upon reading the tokens <script> invokes the 
JavaScript interpreter to interpret a JavaScript program, or 
switching from an HTML body context to a JavaScript context. 
An attack string in either the attribute context or tag body context 
thus uses a sequence of pre-escaping characters to manipulate the 
browser to invoke the JavaScript interpreter. If the attack string is 
already in a JavaScript context, it uses a sequence of pre-escaping 
characters to insert the attack payload as an additional JavaScript 
statement. Figure 7 illustrates context switching using an example. 
Suppose an interpreter has already consumed characters t1t2t3 and 
currently is in context C1. The goal of attack string, t4t5…tn, is to 
change the context using the single quote character to indicate the 
end of an attribute value, followed by inserting a tag event key 
word (onclick) which switches to a JavaScript context. After that 
switch, a JavaScript program can be inserted. 
  Context 1   
 …t1t2t3  t4t5  . . .    tn    tn+1tn+2tn+3       
Before Attack:  
<a href='javascript:void(0)’  id=prj<%=escapeHtml(pid )  %>  ‘  /> 
Attack String:  
  t4t5  . . .    tn           ‘ onclick()=’attack();’  
After Attack:  
<a href=’javascript:void(0)’   id=prj ‘ onclick=attack(); ‘   ‘ /> 
Figure 7. Context Changing 
In the state machine for attack generation, states correspond to 
states of an interpreter. Starting states corresponds to the three 
contexts where attack scripts can be injected: attribute value, tag 
body, and JavaScript. The state machine is built with the objective 
of enumeration all possible transitions from a start state to a 
context where a JavaScript program can be executed. Transitions 
are based on grammars of web languages (HTML, CSS, URL, 
JavaScript). A token list is associated with each transition, 
representing possible input tokens that can take the interpreter 
from one state to another state along the path to the objective. 
Final states, indicated by small bold circles, represent completion 
of an attack string.  
An attack script is generated by traversing the state machine while 
appending tokens associate with transition link to the output 
string. The number of tokens in transition lists determines number 
of different combinations or attack vectors. For example, having 
different tokens listed on links between states, by traversing from 
S1 to S2 to S3 in sample state machine shown in Figure 8 we 
would have 4 different output strings: T1T3, T1T4, T2T3 and 
T2T4. 
Figure 9 illustrates the state machine for attack generation. We 
explain the state machine based on the three possible starting 
points of a successful attack. 
3.1 Attribute Value Context 
This part of the state machine considers the situation where an 
attack string is injected in the middle of a tag definition (e.g. the 
definition of an <input> tag), or the tag attribute context. Table 1 
lists states for the attribute value context. Attribute value context 
is located with the STag definition of the XML grammar in Figure 
6.  
Starting from state S1, we have two possibilities to change the 
context to JavaScript. The first option (1.1) is when the attack 
string is located as part of a predefined special attribute (one of: 
style, href, src). In this case any tokens labeled by Ctx.Keywords 
in Table 2 can take the interpreter into a JavaScript context and 
then final state. For clarity, each token is enclosed by {}. String 
{%V%} in Table 2 represents a place where an attack payload 
can be inserted. This path generates three possible attack strings: { 
javascript:attack(); } , { url(‘javascript:attak();’) } and 
{expression('attack()')} with the last one targeting IE7 and earlier. 
Table 1. Attribute Value States 
State Description 
S1  Starting point of state machine for injection 
into attributes’ value 
S2 The Tag’s valued finished and can add a new 
attribute or closing the tag 
S3 A special attribute (e.g. CSS, URI enabled) 
added and ready to switch to JavaScript context 
S4 Context changed to JavaScript 
S5  Starting point of state machine for injection 
points in tag’s body. 
 
Table 2. Attribute Value & Tag Content: Labels 
Transition Tokens 
Att.Marker {‘},{“},{‘ “},{“ ‘} 
End.Tag  { >} ,{ />} 
Tag.Starter  {<a }, {<img } 
Att.Starter  { atb=} , { atb='} ,  atb="} 
Event  { onclick='%V%' } 
Ctx.Keywords {url('javascript:%V%')}, {javascript:} , 
{expression('%V%')} 
Spec.Att  { src=},{ style=}, {href=} 
Start.Script  {<script>%V%</script>},{</script><scri
pt>%V%</script>}  
,{</title><script>%V%</script>}  
,{</textarea><script>%V%</script>} 
 
The second possibility (1.2) in state S1 is to close the current tag 
attribute to start a new attribute accepting JavaScript programs. 
Tokens signaling the end of tag attributed are labeled Att.Marker 
in Table 2. This takes the state machine to state S2. According to 
the STag grammar rule, at this point one can have three options: 
first (2.1) closing the tag using ‘>’ (End.Tag) and be in the tag 
body context represented by state S5 or second (2.2) adding an 
event attribute, and the third option (2.3) adding special attributes. 
Selecting the second option (2.2) in state S2 can be done by using 
tokens labeled Event in link between S2 and S4.  
We only generate one representative event, ‘onclick’, as all other  
2 1 3
{T3,T4} {T1,T2} 
Figure 8. Sample State Machine 
 events work in the same way as far as running a JavaScript 
program is concerned. Reaching state S4 means that we are in a 
JavaScript context and can place our attack payload indicated by 
%V%.  
After state S4 the tag attribute definition is complete and we can 
close the tag with tokens in the End.Tag label between state S4 
and the final state. In summary, this path {S1 + S2 + S4 +Final 
State} generates attack scripts by appending tokens of the { 
Att.Marker + Event  + End.Tag }, or  ‘onclick=attak(); >  as one 
of the possibilities. 
Option (2.3) in state S2 is adding a special attribute. In this option 
Special.Att label takes interpreter to state S3 to add one of the 
special attributes (src, href). These attributes have the built in 
capability to switch to JavaScript. Once we are in state S3 we use 
any tokens labeled by Ctx.Keywords that can take the interpreter 
into a JavaScript context in state S4. In summary, the path {S1 + 
S2 + S3 + S4 +Final State} generates attack scripts by appending 
tokens of {  Att.Marker + Spec.Att + Ctx.Keywords  + End.Tag }, 
with  ‘ href= javascript:attack(); >  as an example.   
3.2 Tag Content Context  
This part of the state machine considers the situation where an 
attack string is injected in the middle of a tag body (e.g. <td>, 
<title>, or <style>), corresponding to content rule in XML 
grammar definition of 6. Table 3 summarizes all the states related 
to this scenario. 
Table 3. Tag Content States 
State Description 
S5  Starting point of state machine for injection 
into tag’s body. 
S6 The Tag’s valued finished and can add a new 
attribute or closing the tag 
S7 A special attribute (e.g. CSS, URI enabled) 
added and ready to switch to JavaScript context 
S8 Context changed to JavaScript 
From start state S5, two options are available to switch to execute 
a JavaScript program: (5.1) using <script> tag to switch to 
JavaScript context or (5.2) creating a new tag with a JavaScript 
program as part of its attribute value. 
Option (5.1) is represented by the transition between S5 and the 
final state with tokens labeled Start.Script in Table 2.  This 
transition considers two possible situations. The first case is the 
attack string is in a tag body where a JavaScript program can be 
inserted using the <script>…</script> pair tags. The second 
situation is the attack string is in a tag body that does not accept 
the <script>…</script> pair tags. Based on relevant W3C 
specifications, the latter case can occur if the attack string is in 
these tag bodies: <script> (nested scripts are not allowed), 
<title>, and <textarea>. These tags must be closed in order to 
invoke the attack payload. The following attack string 
</title><script> Attack(); </script>  is an example of this option. 
Option (5.2) means that we start a new tag with Tag.Starer label( 
Table 2) and transition to S6. Several tags can take JavaScript 
programs as an attribute value; most of them are syntactically 
isomorphic so we do not need to consider all of them. We choose 
the achor (<a) and image (<img) tags because they have the most 
attribute options (e.g href, src). Other possible attacks can be 
syntactically mapped to attack strings starting with these tags. 
S6 is a state where a new tag has been started.  This state is 
similar to state S2 discussed in the previous section.  Instead of 
transitioning to S2, we create S6 because W3C does not allow 
nested tags. At this point we have two options to switch to 
JavaScript context one option (6.1) adding events and option (6.2) 
adding special attributes.   
Option (6.1) leads to this path: {S5 + S6 + S8 +Final State}. This 
path generates attack scripts by appending tokens of the 
{Tag.Startter + Event  + End.Tag }. For example:  <img 
onlcick=’attak();’ > is a generated attack string. 
Option (6.2) leads to path {S5 + S6 + S7 + S8 +Final State}  
which generates attack scripts by appending tokens of { 
Tag.Startter + Spec.Att + Ctx.Keywords + End.Tag }, with <a  
href= javascript:attack();  > as an example.  
3.3 JavaScript Context  
This part of the state machine considers the situation where an 
attack string is injected into the middle of a JavaScript Program.  
An attacker will have to insert pre-escaping characters to end the 
current JavaScript statement and insert an attack statement. Tables 
4 and 5 summarize states and transition labels for this attack 
category.  
In this paper we considered two common types of attacks in the 
JavaScript context: the attack string is part of an expression on the 
right hand side of an assignment statement, or the attack string is 
part of an expression that is parameter to a function call. Our 
approach can be extended to cover all possible attacks in the 
JavaScript context.  
Spec.Att S8
Ctx Switcher 
S6
Tag.Starter
S7 EndTag 
Event 
S5 
Start.Script 
End.Tag 
Att.Marker 
S1 S2 S3 S4
End.Tag 
Event  
Ctx Switcher 
Ctx SwitcherSpec.Att 
S 
S11
Stmt.Suffix Literal.TermS9 S10
Expr.Separator  
Figure 9.Attack generation State Machine
Table 4.JavaScript States 
State Description 
S9 Attack string injected into JavaScript context  
S10 Current expression containing injection point 
joined to a new attack payload expression  
S11 Attack payload added and the remaining 
characters( if any) should be commented out 
 
Table 5.JavaScript Labels 
Label Tokens 
Literal.Term { ‘ } ,{ “ } 
Exp.Seprator { +  (%V%)} ,{ ; %V% } , { ); %V%)} 
Stmt.Suffix Null, {   // } , { ); // } 
 
In either case the attack string is part of a string literal that is 
enclosed either by a pair of double quotes, or a pair of single 
quotes, as defined by JavaScript language specifications [4]: 
  StringLiteral ::= "StringChars"|'StringChars ' 
To insert the attack payload, the pre-escaping must first terminate 
the string literal it is part of. This can be accomplished by adding 
either a single quote or a double quote to end the string literal: 
transitioning from S9 to S10 using literal terminator tokens 
labeled by Literal.Term in Table 5.  After closing the string 
literals we are in state S10 and ready to add the attack payload. 
Two cases are possible: (10.1) attack string is part of an existing 
expression, or (10.2) the attack string needs to start a new 
statement.  
Tokens to accomplish this goal are listed under the 
Exp.Separator label of Table 5 leading us from state S10 to S11. 
For 10.1, one can use an operator, e.g. the string concatenation 
operator +. For option 10.2, two cases are possible. If the attack 
string is part of an assignment statement, a semicolon can 
terminate the assignment statement {;}. If the attack string is part 
of a function call, it can be terminated by {);}.  Once we are in 
state S11 we can add the attack payload as indicated by %V% 
placeholders in Table 5. 
3.4 Discussions on Attack Generation 
We have built a state machine based model to generate XSS 
attack strings, based on published W3C grammars for JavaScript 
and related markup languages. Our goal is to generate a set of 
attack strings that can “cover” all possible successful attacks in 
the sense that for each possible successful attack string y, our 
attack generation process can generate at least one string z such 
that z can be mapped to y.  This means (1) the size z is less than or 
equal to size of y, and (2) z can be mapped to y such that if y is a 
successful attack string, than z is also a successful attack string. 
We have empirically evaluated this claim of coverage as will be 
described next section. Research is underway to formalize the 
steps of state machine construction described in this section in 
such a way that we can perform a more formal analysis of attack 
coverage.  
It should be noted that browsers, particularly early versions of 
browsers, do not strictly follow W3C published standards. They 
tolerate syntax errors by rendering web pages that do not conform 
to markup language grammar. These exceptions can be 
accommodated in our approach as long as such exceptions are 
well defined. For example, we included generation of attack 
strings targeting IE7 in the attribute value context. Fortunately, 
modern browsers are converging by adhering more strictly to 
W3C standards. Finally as mentioned earlier, we need to extend 
the state machine to cover the entire JavaScript context. 
4. EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS 
We conducted empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of our 
approach. First we applied this approach to one module of an open 
source project iTrust, a medical record management system with 
over 112K lines of Java/JSP code.  Several XSS vulnerabilities 
were found. These vulnerabilities all stem from using html 
escaping for JavaScript context. A representative example is 
shown in Figure 10 along with a successful attack string generated 
by our attack generator. In this case the request.getParameter()  is 
an untrusted source. The developer used HTML body encoding in 
a context where JavaScript encoding is needed. We scanned iTrust 
source code using Fortify SCA, a leading commercial static 
analysis tool. These vulnerabilities were not reported by Fortify 
SCA. 
<input onclick= "parent.location.href= 'getPatientID.jsp? 
forward= <%=escapeHtml("" + ( 
request.getParameter("forward") )) %> ';”  /> 
Attack vector:  ‘; attack(); // 
Figure 10.Sanitization Flaw found in iTrust 
Second, we looked at the performance of our attack generation.  
The experiments were performed on an iMac computer with a 2.8 
GHz Intel core i7 with 8GB RAM. A total of 497 different attack 
strings can be generated based on the state machine in Figure 9. 
Generating and evaluating all these attack strings for a unit case 
takes 8.1 seconds of total execution time. Currently, once a 
successful attack script founds, the testing process stops and 
remaining none-tested attack scripts would not be checked and so 
cannot say how many successful attack scripts exist.   
We evaluated the coverage of our attack generation model. We 
randomly selecting 400 attack scripts from a well-known 
repository of successful XSS attacks reported by penetration 
testers, xssed.com. This repository is often used by security 
researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of defense mechanisms 
(e.g. [1][8]).  Selected scripts represent one percent of scripts in 
the repository. Our comparisons show 334 (83.5%) attack scripts 
corresponds exactly to at least one of the attack strings generated 
by our approach.  
Each of the remaining 66 attack scripts can map to at least one of 
the attack strings generated by our approach. We illustrate a 
representative example: {">'><script> attack(); </script>} is found 
in xssed.com. Our attack generator can generate {' ><script> 
attack(); </script>}, and {“><script> attack(); </script>}. The attack 
script in xsssed.com is a super string of both attack strings 
generated by our state machine. Although information about 
target application is not included in xssed.com, our analysis 
suggests that one of the two attack stings generated by our 
approach should be successful against that target.  
5. DISCUSSION  
Our approach may be applied to test for other injection 
vulnerabilities, such as command injection against shell scripts. 
Injection vulnerability is the largest class of software security 
flaws.  It is well known that input validation is the most important 
defense against software vulnerabilities[5].  Wherever white list 
based input validation[5] is used, the question of whether the 
correct validation function is used for a particular application 
context naturally arises.  Unit testing, using a similar approach as 
outlined here, can provide such assurance.  
There are also cases where more than one sanitization functions 
must be used. In such cases, in addition to the issue of whether the 
correct sanitization function is used, one must also consider 
whether sanitization functions are applied in the correct order. 
Take the following example from a web application described 
in[6], a tainted variable is sanitized using two standard encoders 
of escapeHtmlDecimal and escapeJavascript before used in final 
sink <%= %>: 
<% htmlEsc =escapeHtmlDecimal( Tainted); %> 
<input onclick="Fn(‘<%= escapeJavascriptl(htmlEsc) %>’); ” 
type='button'   /> 
In this case, the order of encoders is incorrect. If the tainted value 
contains the single quote {‘} the escapeHtmlDecimal escapes it to 
{&#39;}. After this, the escapeJavaScript does nothing to this 
string. So an attack string {‘);attack(); //}will be changed to 
{&#39;);attack(); //}. Most browsers have an internal decoding 
feature, known as implicit transduction [15], that un-escapes a 
string before evaluation a JavaScript program. In this case the 
attack string is changed back to ‘); attack();//  which successfully 
can exploit the vulnerable web application. The correct sequence 
is to apply escapeJavaScript before escapeHtmlDecimal. Our 
approach can detect this vulnerability.  
There are other types of XSS vulnerability not addressed by our 
approach. Consider a blogging web site where one wants to 
permit end users the use of HTML markup tags for formatting.  
HTML body encoding cannot be used for blog content because 
HTML body encoding would disable all HTML markup tags.  
There are heuristic filter functions, e.g.[10] that try to block 
unwanted JavaScript programs in HTML body context. Such 
filters have proven to be very difficult to verify as many patches 
have been issued. Much industry effort such as [10,16] have been 
focused on testing this type of vulnerability. However, this type of 
vulnerability affects a relatively small fraction of web application 
functions. This is evidenced by the that fact a well referenced 
industry best practice XSS prevention programming guide[9] 
exclusively discusses how to match encoders to web application 
contexts.  
6. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we propose a unit test based approach to detect a 
large class of common cross-site scripting vulnerability caused by 
applying a wrong output encoder for a given application context. 
Our contributions are highlighted below.  First the unit test 
approach can be easily integrated into integrated development 
environments and the software development process to detect 
security vulnerabilities early in the development[17]. Most 
software developers would be able to detect and correct these 
problems without engaging security experts. This can save 
valuable security testing resources to focus on other types of 
vulnerabilities. Second our approach can be applied to all web 
applications as well as newer applications written in template 
languages.  Third this approach has the potential to be applied to 
detect other types of injection attacks. Our evaluation shows that 
the approach can be applied efficiently to detect vulnerabilities in 
large open source applications. Empirical study suggests our 
approach has good coverage of possible attacks. Current work is 
under way to more formally analyze attack coverage. 
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